The paper presents a game theoretical approach to the control of a formation of unmanned vehicles. The objectives of the formation are to follow a prescribed trajectory, avoiding obstacles while maintaining the geometry of the formation. Formation control is implemented using game theory while obstacles are avoided using Null Space Based Behavioral Control algorithm. Two different obstacle avoidance scenarios are analyzed and compared. Numerical simulation results are presented, to validate the proposed approach.
INTRODUCTION
In the cooperative control field, algorithms to achieve the formation maintenance among multiple vehicles have received significant attention (for instance : Desai, Ostrowski and Kumar, 1998; Kang, Xi and Sparks, 2000; Ögren, Egerstedt and Hu, 2001; Leonard and Fiorelli, 2001; OlfatiSaber and Murray, 2002) . A formation of unmanned vehicles can handle a wider range of tasks and accomplish some tasks more efficiently than a single unmanned vehicle. Formation control is used in different applications, for example, security patrols, search and rescue in hazardous environments. In military missions, a group of autonomous vehicles are required to keep in a specified formation for area coverage and reconnaissance (Martin, Klupar and Winter, 2001 ).
Several approaches are used in formation control and they can be roughly categorized as leader-follower, behavioral and virtual structure/virtual leader approaches. In the leaderfollower approach (Wang and Hadaegh, 1996) , some vehicles are designated as leaders and others are designated as followers. The leaders track desired trajectories, and the followers track transformed versions of the states of their nearest neighbors. In the behavioral approach (Balch and Arkin, 1998; Lawton, Beard and Young, 2003 ) the control action for each vehicle is defined by a weighted average of the control corresponding to each desired behavior for the vehicle. In the virtual structure/virtual leader approach (Lewis and Tan, 1997; Kang, Xi and Sparks, 2000) , all the vehicles or in other words the entire formation is seen as a single rigid body.
Game Theory is one of the major analytical tools for the dynamic analysis of economics and social sciences. It is also used for modeling of social interactions of rational entities, and for the prediction of outcomes of conflicts among them (Myerson, 1991) . It can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers (Myerson, 1991) . Since unmanned vehicles are developing into intelligent rational decision-makers the same approach may be used in the modeling of formation of unmanned vehicles. Formation control can be modeled as a noncooperative game where the self-enforcing Nash equilibrium can be used as the formation control strategy. In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep their unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Autonomous mobile robots and vehicles can adopt this mechanism to establish their strategies to interact with other team members during the process of formation keeping (Gu, 2008) . Distributed control is synthesized by defining cost functions that include neighboring vehicles only, and a leader-follower approach is used with the leader's cost function incorporating trajectory tracking, while formation control implemented in the followers' performance index.
The Null Space Based Behavioral Control (NSBBC) strategy is based on degrading the general obstacle avoidance process into smaller problems which are less complex (Antonelli, Arrichiello and Chiaverini, 2005; Cellini, Mati, Pollini and Innocenti, 2007) .
In Section 2 the model of the system. In Section 3 the Nash equilibrium and differential games are discussed, as applied to the present problem. NSBBC is reviewed in Section 4. Numerical simulations are shown in Section 5, and conclusions presented in Section 6.
MODEL
In this paper, we present the comparison between the cases which only the leader vehicle runs the obstacle avoidance (O.A.) algorithm and the followers follow the leader and which all the vehicles runs this algorithm while maintaining the formation and avoiding the obstacle. In the case which just the leader vehicle runs the O.A. algorithm to avoid the obstacle, the followers do not need to have sophisticated hardware which brings some advantages e.g. freedom and flexibility on design. Thus, the formation can be assigned to different type of missions. But in this case, the leader must know the dimension(s) and the position(s) of the obstacle(s) and dimension of the formation. Also the formation can be broken up. Under these conditions, the O.A. cannot be guaranteed in dynamically changing environments. For this reason, the NSBBC algorithm should be executed on all the vehicles to avoid the dynamic obstacle(s). The remainder of the section presents the modeling of the scenario.
Dynamics of Unmanned Vehicles
In this paper it is considered a m dimensional space where a group of unmanned vehicles are moving. A formation group consists of N vehicles, and each vehicle has double integrator dynamics. The position vector is ,...,
Vehicles' dynamics and the dynamics of the reference are assumed to be linear: 
The team dynamics and its desired target are then: 
Formation of Unmanned Vehicles
To maintain the connection between the unmanned vehicles graph theoretical approach is used. A graph 
where 
where (2 ) = ⊗ ɶ m Q Q I . The Laplacian matrix Q is independent of the graph orientation, it is symmetric, its eigenvalues are real and it is positive semi-definite. This is also valid for ɶ Q . The team formation error becomes;
A general cost function can be written as follows;
The cost function for vehicle i using a finite horizon approach can be written as follows;
By transforming (11) and (12) to a standard linear quadratic form we obtain (13) and (14) respectively;
where λ ij and ij R are weights and T is the finite time horizon.
From the previous definitions; (2 ) , ,
, , 
by multiplying both sides of (18) by -1 we obtain; 1 , 1 ( )
Then, the differential game admits a unique Nash equilibrium solution given by; 
The control signal depends on the current error which is defined separately for each vehicle, unlike standard game theory approaches found in the literature. The error vector is different for each vehicle.
The cost function for the receding horizon approach which the vehicles try to minimize can be written as;
where t is the current time and ( ) z t is the current state vector. The receding horizon approach at each step the control uses ( ) z t as the initial state vector. The control signal is;
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, + t t T , in the next step the procedure repeats again for the next time interval.
NSB BEHAVIORAL CONTROL
The NSBBC strategy is based on degrading the general obstacle avoidance process into smaller problems wich are less complex (Antonelli, Arrichiello and Chiaverini, 2005; Cellini, Mati, Pollini and Innocenti, 2007) .
Let us consider a generic manipulator; the end effector velocity can be written as a function of the joints variables q set as;
From (24), it can be computed the joints velocities ɺ q required, in order for the end effector to move at a given speed as shown in (25) In general, the additional degrees of freedom are used to obtain a solution of (25) that minimizes some joint velocity norm. It is possible, however, to get a non minimum norm solution, and to use the redundancy for other objectives. A possible non minimum norm solution that uses the Jacobian pseudo inverse † ( ) e J q is given by: † † ( ) ( ( ). ( )) e e e e a q J q x J q J
In (26), ɺ a q is projected on ( ) e Ker j . The end effector's velocity vector ɺ q has a component that allows the effector to follow a prescribed trajectory. The additional component ɺ a q does not have any effect on the motion. This procedure can be used to compute ɺ a q to yield a hierarchical structure subdivided into tasks.
The above mentioned property can be generalized from the case of redundant manipulators, to problems requiring dividing an objective into tasks having different priorities, such as the motion control of an autonomous vehicle within an environment with obstacle(s) (Antonelli, Arrichiello and Chiaverini, 2005; Gans and Hutchinson, 2008 ).
For our scenario, the robot configuration q can be replaced by the vehicle position, joint velocities vector ɺ q may be used to represent the vehicle planar velocity, the end effector position e x becomes the variable to be regulated to a desired value, and the Jacobian matrix, as for robots, describes the vector space of allowed velocities. Thus (25) becomes; † ( )
where
v the vehicle's desired velocity, J the matrix of velocities allowed for the task, and σ the task variable that must be controlled. Equation (27) is modified with the addition of a control term for closed loop position error elimination; thus:
where σ is the desired value of the task variable, σɶ is the tracking error and Λ is a positive definite gain matrix. So, σ
and J can be used to define tasks appropriately, and then to compute the speed necessary to accomplish them.
In order to avoid a collision, the obstacle avoidance task affects the vehicle's velocity along the direction toward the obstacle. The magnitude of task velocity is a function of the distance to the obstacle and it becomes zero in the proximity of obstacle edge (Note that we are assuming a 2D motion space in this paper). Should the vehicle go beyond the circle's limit, the speed sign is reversed. 
Since any velocity direction must be able to be imposed by the task, g J is a 2x2 identity matrix, which identifies all possible velocities on the plane. The planar position is the task variable σ g , which must be reach the desired value σ g . Therefore:
and:
The matrix g J is full rank, thus its null space is empty. In the case of a single obstacle, the main rule is that if the desired position of the vehicle is inside the safety circle, then the primary task becomes the obstacle avoidance task and following the trajectory becomes the secondary task. Otherwise, the velocity is calculated using (23). When the obstacle avoidance is the primary task, the velocity of the vehicle is calculated via projecting in the null space of the obstacle avoidance task by using the following equation;
SIMULATIONS
We consider the problem of formation keeping and O.A. for a triangle shaped formation, which must follow a rectilinear trajectory. The formation consists of 10 N = agents moving on a plane. The underlying graph structure is shown in Fig. 1 . Agent 1 is assigned as the leader of the formation and the rest of the agents, are the followers. The leader agent makes use of (15) and (16) in order to calculate its cost function which includes both tracking and formation costs. The followers just make use of (13) and (14) in order to find their cost functions, which only include formation cost.
The geometry of the formation and the weights between the neighbors which are used to compute the cost functions (13) and (14) The phase plane history of the formation where just the leader vehicle executes the O.A. algorithm is shown in Fig. 2 and Fig.3 . The leader vehicle must set the radius of the obstacle, which is d in (29), such that all the vehicles in the formation avoid the obstacle. In Fig.2 , the radius d is 3 times the real radius of the obstacle. It is seen that in both cases the triangle shaped formation is maintained during the entire mission. But, in Fig.3 . it is seen that not all the vehicles in formation can avoid the obstacle. The reason of this is that, the leader vehicle does not take care if the followers can avoid the obstacle or not.
In Fig. 4 , it seen the phase plane history of the formation where all the vehicles execute the obstacle avoidance algorithm to avoid several obstacles. Since the velocity vector computed by (20) for all the agents is different, in Fig. 4 it is seen that the formation is not maintained while the vehicles avoid the obstacle. Moreover this change depends on the position of each vehicle. Since the position of each vehicle is different, the obstacles affect differently each agent, causing the formation break up.
In Fig. 5 (a) and (b), it is shown the error between the desired trajectory and the trajectory followed by the agents for the formation which just the leader vehicle executes the O.A. algorithm. It can be seen that the errors are almost the same for all the vehicles. This means that the formation is almost maintained during entire mission. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a game theoretical approach to maintain the formation within a group of vehicles and NSBBC algorithm to avoid the obstacle(s). We compared the cases where just the leader executes the O.A. algorithm and the case where all the agents execute it, highlighting pros and cons of both of them. As the future work, we aim to formalize as a constrained optimization problem the formation keeping and obstacle avoidance tasks.
